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Divine	Action	and	Operative	Grace	
David	Efird	and	David	Worsley	
Department	of	Philosophy,	University	of	York	
	
Operative	grace	is	generally	considered	to	be	a	paradigm	example	of	
special	divine	action.	In	this	paper,	we	suggest	one	reason	to	think	
operative	grace	might	be	consistent	with	general	divine	action	alone.	
On	our	view,	then,	a	deist	can	consistently	believe	in	a	doctrine	of	
saving	faith.	
	
Orthodox	Christian	belief	about	salvation	is	tempered	by	what	Kevin	Timpe	calls	‘an	Anti-
Pelagian	Constraint’:	
(APC)	No	fallen	human	individual	is	able	to	cause	or	will	any	good,	including	the	will	
of	her	coming	to	saving	faith,	apart	from	a	unique	grace.
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This	unique,	or	operative,	grace	is	taken	to	be	a	gift	from	God,	and,	as	such,	is	often	held	up	
to	be	a	paradigm	example	of	special	divine	action.
2
	We	can	see	why	this	is	the	case	in	how	
Aquinas	defines	‘operative	grace’:	
An	operation	which	is	part	of	an	effect	is	attributed	to	the	mover,	not	to	the	thing	
moved.	The	operation	is	therefore	attributed	to	God	when	God	is	the	sole	mover,	
and	when	the	mind	is	moved	but	not	a	mover.	We	then	speak	of	‘operative	grace.’
3
	
2	
	
By	speaking	of	God	as	the	mover,	it	seems	that	God	is	here	acting	specially,	rather	than	
generally.	But	we	want	to	suggest	that	need	not	be	the	case;	rather	than	God	moving	the	
mind,	that	is,	acting	on	the	mind	Himself,	it	is	the	revelation	of	God	which	moves	the	mind.	
In	this	paper,	we	will	explore	one	way	of	explaining	operative	grace	that	is	consistent	with	
the	Anti-Pelagian	Constraint,	and	yet	also	consistent	with	it	being	an	example	of	general	
divine	action	and	not	special	divine	action.
4
	Once	this	account	has	been	set	out,	we	will	
address	two	major	objections	to	this	view.	
	
I.! Aquinas’s	Moral	Psychology	
On	a	Thomist	moral	psychology,	a	person’s	mind	is	composed	of	a	will	and	an	intellect.
5
	The	
will	is	an	appetite	or	inclination	for	goodness	in	general;	however,	the	will	cannot	
apprehend	what	is	good	on	its	own.	Apprehending	something	as	being	‘good	for	a	person’	is	
the	responsibility	of	the	intellect.	Every	act	of	will	is,	therefore,	necessarily	preceded	by	an	
act	of	intellect,	such	that	the	will	(the	‘moved	mover’)	is	always	an	efficient	cause,	and	the	
intellect	is	always	the	final	cause.	Because	it	is	also	possible	for	the	will	to	move	the	intellect	
(so	long	as	there	is	a	preceding	act	of	intellect),	Eleonore	Stump	has	argued	that	this	
Thomist	account	of	the	mind	fits	well	with	Harry	Frankfurt’s	account	of	the	hierarchy	of	the	
will,	such	that	there	are	first-order	intellect-will	moves,	second-order	intellect-will-intellect-
will	moves	and	(quite	rarely)	third-order	intellect-will-intellect-will-intellect-will	moves.
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Now,	the	intellect	is	capable	of,	and,	in	fact,	does,	apprehend	numerous	actions	as	being	
‘good	for	a	person’	at	any	given	time.	The	will,	naturally,	will	incline	itself	toward	anything	
apprehended	by	the	intellect	as	being	‘good	for	a	person’.	However,	the	will	is	not	a	digital	
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on	/	off	switch.	As	a	rational	appetite,	the	will	is	capable	of	inclining	itself	further	towards	
those	desires	to	which	it	is	most	disposed,	and	to	act	on	the	desire	it	is	most	disposed	
toward	to	form	an	effective	desire	(that	is,	a	volition).	A	first-order	volition	produces	action,	
a	second-order	volition	strengthens	or	weakens	the	first-order	act	of	intellect	(or	will),	and	a	
third-order	volition	strengthens	or	weakens	a	second-order	act	of	intellect	(or	will).		
On	this	account,	first-order	desires	are	always	apprehended	by	the	intellect	(a	first-order	act	
of	intellect),	but	they	can	be	involuntarily	prompted	by	a	whole	series	of	causes	external	to	
either	the	intellect’s	reflection	on	some	knowledge	or	a	second-order	act	of	will.
7
	For	
instance,	the	intellect’s	involuntary	apprehension	of	the	sensitive	appetites	(the	passions)	or	
the	natural	appetites	can	also	prompt	a	first-order	desire	in	the	will.	Second-order	desires,	
however,	cannot	be	involuntarily	apprehended,	for	they	represent	an	act	of	reason	
concerning	first-order	desires	(namely,	a	second-order	act	of	intellect).	In	this	way,	second-
order	desires	can	be	said	to	represent	the	desires	with	which	a	person	would	choose	to	
identify.	
On	this	account,	a	person	is	said	to	act	with	freedom	of	the	will	if	their	first-order	and	
second-order	volitions	align,	that	is,	if	that	person	does	what	they	want	to	want	to	do.	
However,	that	person	remains	morally	responsible	for	their	first-order	volitions	regardless	
of	whether	first-	and	second-order	volitions	align,	assuming	there	has	been	no	internal	
manipulation	between	the	first-order	intellect,	will,	and	action.
8
	It	will	prove	instructive	to	
note	that	such	misalignment	can	be	caused	in	two	different	ways.	Consider	first	the	
unhappy	heroin	addict,	John.	John	is	also	a	new	father,	and	has	decided	he	wants	to	(want	
to)	quit	his	drug	use	in	order	to	be	a	better	parent	to	his	child.	John	has	a	second-order	
volition	to	quit	heroin.	Unfortunately	for	John,	although	this	second-order	volition	
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strengthens	his	first-order	will	a	little,	he	does	not	have	the	strength	of	(first-order)	will	to	
resist	all	temptation.	The	next	time	he	is	offered	heroin	he	turns	it	down,	but	the	time	after,	
he	gives	in	and	takes	the	drug.	He	is	disgusted	at	himself,	upset	at	what	he	has	done,	and	on	
this	Thomistic	account,	has	not	in	fact	acted	with	freedom	of	the	will.	Nevertheless,	John	
and	only	John	is	morally	responsible	for	his	action.	But	there	is	another	general	way	John’s	
first-	and	second-order	will	might	misalign.	Over	time	(and	repeated	relapses),	John	loses	
both	his	job	and	his	partner,	and	turns	to	crime	to	fund	his	habit.	John	is	arrested,	and	in	
consequence	of	his	actions,	loses	visiting	rights	to	his	child,	the	one	thing	he	really	cares	
about.	As	the	months	pass	by,	John	comes	to	think	his	only	solace	in	life	comes	whilst	in	a	
heroin	induced	stupor,	and	indeed,	he	comes	wants	to	want	this	escape	from	his	shame	and	
guilt	and	loneliness.	Although	there	is	still	a	part	of	John’s	volitional	complex	that	wants	to	
want	to	be	good	part	of	his	child’s	life,	there	is	a	part	of	John	that	now	wants	to	want	to	
escape	into	a	heroin	induced	stupor.	As	it	would	happen,	these	two	desires	are	just	strong	
enough	to	prevent	one	being	preferred	over	the	other.	John	has	conflicting	second-order	
desires,	but	no	second-order	volition.	Whatever	John’s	unreflective	first-order	volitions	are,	
they	cannot	align	with	his	second-order	volitions,	because	he	does	not	have	any.	John	is,	
with	respect	to	choices	about	his	heroin	addiction,	what	Harry	Frankfurt	would	describe	as	a	
wanton.
9
		
	
II.! Grace	as	Revelation	
With	so	much	said,	given	that	on	this	Thomist	account	of	mind,	a	person’s	will	is	already	
inclined	to	goodness	in	general,	and,	given	that	most	theists	(and	certainly	all	Thomists)	are	
committed	to	the	belief	that	God	is	good,	and	that	union	with	God	is	the	greatest	good	for	a	
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person,	it	seems	that	all	God	needs	to	do	to	motivate	a	desire	for	Him	in	a	person	is	simply	
to	reveal,	partially	or	fully,	His	goodness	to	them.	If	this	person	appropriately	attends	to	
God’s	revelation	of	goodness,	this	person	would	come	to	desire	union	with	God,	that	is,	
they	will	come	to	have	saving	faith.
10
	
Although	of	course	it	might	involve	special	divine	action,
11
	this	revelation	of	divine	goodness	
need	not	require	special	divine	action.	According	to	the	Apostle	Paul	in	Romans	1:19-20,	
God	placed	evidence	of	His	divine	nature,	that	is	to	say,	His	goodness,	into	His	creation	at	
the	point	of	creation,	and	that	this	revelation	can	still	be	seen.	He	writes,	
For	what	can	be	known	about	God	is	plain	to	them,	because	God	has	shown	it	to	
them.	Ever	since	the	creation	of	the	world	his	eternal	power	and	divine	nature,	
invisible	though	they	are,	have	been	understood	and	seen	through	the	things	he	has	
made.	So	they	are	without	excuse.	
So,	reflecting	on	the	beauty	of	a	spectacular	sunset	on	the	ocean,	or	the	grandeur	of	a	
Himalayan	mountain	range,	or	even	just	the	beauty	of	a	tree,	or	a	mathematical	proof,	or	
one’s	spouse,	might	be	sufficient	to	perceive	the	goodness	of	their	creator.	If	operative	
grace	can	be	explained	as	the	revelation	of	God’s	goodness,	and,	if	this	revelation	is	readily	
available	to	all	in	God’s	creation,	it	looks	like	operative	grace	does	not	require	an	act	of	
special	divine	action	at	all.	If	general	divine	action	can	explain	creation	as	we	perceive	it,	
operative	grace	is	always	and	everywhere	available	to	all,	and	has	been	since	the	divine	first	
cause.	
	
III.! Objection	1:	Special	Divine	Action	and	Quiescence	
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But	perhaps	this	move	is	too	quick.	According	to	the	Anti-Pelagian	Constraint,	no	fallen	
human	individual	is	able	to	cause	or	will	any	good,	including	the	will	of	her	coming	to	saving	
faith,	apart	from	a	unique	grace.	There	is	a	crucial	step	between	God’s	revelation	of	His	
goodness	in	creation	and	a	person	coming	to	have	saving	faith,	namely,	that	person	
appropriately	attending	to	this	revelation.	Inasmuch	as	the	Anti-Pelagian	Constraint	
prevents	a	person	from	coming	to	saving	faith	by	themselves,	it	would	also	seem	to	prevent	
a	person	from	coming	to	appropriately	attend	to	this	revelation.	Rather	than	accept	such	a	
revelation	as	being	from	God,	and	reflecting	His	goodness,	the	fallen	human	individual	looks	
set	to	reject	this	revelation.	The	Anti-Pelagian	Constraint,	then,	entails	a	sort	of	willed	
blindness	or	deafness	to	God’s	goodness	by	the	fallen	human	individual.	
The	Thomist	account,	however,	has	the	resources	to	respond	to	this	difficulty.	Recall	that	on	
Aquinas’s	account	of	the	will,	the	will	is	not	just	a	binary	switch	between	‘accepting	
something’	and	‘rejecting	something’,	for	the	will	is	more	akin	to	an	appetite,	and	as	such,	
can	also	be	quiescent	with	respect	to	something,	neither	accepting	it	or	rejecting	it,	but	
rather,	neutral	to	it,	that	is	to	say,	having	no	attitude	toward	it.	If	it	is	the	case	that	
quiescence	with	respect	to	God’s	revealed-in-creation	revelation	of	goodness	is	sufficient	
for	‘appropriate	attendance’,	that	is,	omitting	to	reject	that	this	is	a	revelation	of	God’s	
goodness,	all	that	is	needed	for	Anti-Pelagian	Constraint	compatible	saving	faith	is	for	the	
will	to	become	quiescent	with	respect	to	this	operative	grace.
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However,	if	the	Anti-Pelagian	Constraint	entails	that	a	fallen	human	individual’s	will’s	
natural	state	is	to	reject	this	operative	grace,	either	God	must	(1)	internally	manipulate	a	
person’s	will	to	a	state	of	quiescence,	or	(2)	that	person’s	will	must	be	externally	motivated	
towards	such	quiescence.	So,	an	objector	might	respond,	both	(1)	and	(2)	look	like	examples	
7	
	
of	special	divine	action.	If	this	is	the	case,	it	will	be	of	little	importance	that	operative	grace	
itself	is	compatible	with	general	divine	action.
13
	
But	this	objection	is	not	as	problematic	as	it	might	initially	seem.	Whilst	(1)	looks	
incompatible	with	general	divine	action,	(2)	very	plausibly	is	not.	Elsewhere	Eleonore	Stump	
argues	that	external	motivation	to	quiescence	takes	the	form	of	‘melting’	or	‘cracking	a	
person’s	heart.	Stump	argues	that	suffering,	along	with	the	experience	of	blessings	and	love,	
is	an	important	part	of	this	melting	or	cracking	process.
14
	But,	why	think	such	blessings	or	
suffering	are	necessarily	instances	of	special	divine	action?	If,	through	general	divine	action,	
God	created	the	world	as	a	difficult	place,	where	natural	suffering	abounds,	and	where	
natural	blessing	is	possible,	although	perhaps	not	as	efficient	a	world	where	only	
supernatural	suffering	occurs,	assuming	these	might	be	sufficient	to	motivate	quiescence,	
such	a	world	would	be	entirely	consistent	with	operative	grace’s	compatibility	with	general	
divine	action.	
	
IV.! Objection	2:	Grace	and	the	Will	
A	more	difficult	objection	to	avoid	comes	from	tradition,	where	grace	is	seen	as	operative	
on	the	will	(through	‘infusion’
15
)	as	well	as	on	the	intellect.	In	the	account	we	have	so	far	
provided,	operative	grace	seems	operative	on	the	intellect	alone	(through	what	we	might	
call	‘inspiration’	or	‘motivation’).	On	the	account	we	have	been	discussing,	it	seems	less	that	
the	will	actually	changes	its	disposition	and	more	that	it	is	overpowered	by	the	intellect.	The	
concern	here,	then,	is	that	unless	supernaturally	changed,	the	will	will	just	revert	back	to	its	
‘default’	fallen	dispositions	once	the	revelatory	stimuli	is	removed,	or	lessens.	
8	
	
But	note	that	Stump’s	version	of	Thomist	moral	psychology	has	the	resources	to	deal	with	
this	objection,	too.	On	the	Thomist	account,	whilst	both	are	appetites	for	goodness	in	
general,	we	can	offer	a	more	fine-grained	distinction	between	the	dispositions	of	the	first-	
and	second-order	will.	The	second-order	will	is	(was)	ordered	around	a	desire	for	goodness	
as	justice	(‘rectitude’)	whilst	the	first	is	(was)	around	the	desire	for	pleasurable	good	
(‘concupiscence’).	Aquinas	believed	that	the	correct	ordering	of	the	second-order	will	for	
justice	was	a	gift	of	grace	given	to	Adam	by	God,	and	that	this	was	lost	after	the	fall.
16
	With	
justice	now	un-guided,	Adam	and	those	who	follow	him	would	do	what	was	right	in	their	
own	eyes,	and	in	such	a	confused	state,	their	first-order	volitions	would	no	longer	
necessarily	align	with	their	(now	confused)	second-order	desires.
17
	
With	that	in	mind,	we	can	draw	out	two	responses.	The	first	is	just	this:	if	the	correct	
ordering	of	Adam’s	second-order	will	was	a	gift	of	grace,	such	that	when	it	was	removed,	
Adam	could	no	longer	correctly	order	his	desires,	how	is	that	any	different	to	the	account	
we	are	proposing?	On	our	account,	when	appropriately	attended	to,	God’s	gift	of	grace	(the	
revelation	of	his	goodness),	is	also	sufficient	to	correctly	order	desires.	The	only	difference	
is,	perhaps,	in	degree.	The	revelation	of	God’s	goodness	that	Adam	received	might	have	
been	in	some	way	clearer	than	the	revelation	we	receive,	and	so	the	revelation	we	receive	
might	have	a	weaker	effect	on	our	intellect	and	will.	But,	just	as	Adam’s	will	became	
disordered	when	this	grace	was	removed,	so	might	a	person’s	will	become	likewise	
disordered	should	grace,	this	revelatory	stimuli,	be	removed	or	weakened.	
Secondly,	note	that	on	Stump’s	account,	there	are	both	first-,	second-,	and,	crucially	third-
order	desires	possible.
18
	Third-order	desires	have	the	capacity	to	move	second-order	acts	of	
intellect	and	will.
19
	In	being	able	to	move	the	will,	third-order	volitions	also	have	the	
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capacity	to	affect	the	disposition	of	the	will.	Thus,	these	third-order	volitions	look	like	they	
have	the	capacity	to	affect	the	disposition	of	the	second-order	will,	as	a	third-order	act	of	
will	can	act	on	the	second-order	will	directly.	Just	as	first-order	habits	can	be	formed	by	
second-order	acts	of	will,	perhaps	third-order	acts	of	will	can	forge	second-order	habits,	
directly	affecting	the	dispositions	of	the	second-order	will	in	a	way	second-order	acts	of	
intellect	alone	were	unable	to	do.	Recall	our	drug	addict,	John.	When	we	last	saw	him,	John	
was	unable	to	form	second-order	volitions.	He	wanted	to	want	to	quit,	and	he	wanted	to	
want	to	continue	to	take	heroin.	Now,	whilst	in	this	state,	John	hears	that	his	former	partner	
has	late	stage	cancer	and	is	not	long	for	this	world.	Shortly	thereafter,	John	wakes	up	in	the	
emergency	room;	he	had	(inadvertently)	taken	an	overdose.	Whilst	still	in	the	emergency	
room,	his	doctor,	a	childhood	friend	and	someone	familiar	with	his	situation,	reprimands	
him	seriously:		
	Look,	John.	You	could	easily	have	died	tonight.	Had	you	been	found	five	
minutes	later,	you	would	not	have	made	it.	Think	of	your	daughter.	If	you	
died,	your	child	would	soon	be	an	orphan.	You	have	no	other	family	–	your	
child	would	be	put	into	the	foster	system.	Have	you	thought	about	what	
might	happen	to	her?	
With	this,	the	doctor	turns	and	leaves	the	room.	John	in	stunned.	The	doctor’s	reprimand	
cuts	him	to	the	core.	This	event	is	an	occasion	for	him	to	see	afresh	the	cost	his	wanting	to	
want	to	remain	an	addict	might	have	on	his	child,	and	in	so	reasoning	about	what	he	now	
wants	to	want	to	want,	he	is	able	to	weaken	his	second-order	desire	to	remain	an	addict,	
and	strengthen	his	second-order	desire	to	quit	such	that	it	forms	a	second-order	volition.	His	
addiction	has	not	disappeared,	but	John	now	has	the	strength	of	will	to	start	to	fight	against	
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it.	Over	time,	through	repeated	reflection	on	the	doctor’s	comments,	and	through	habitual	
rejection	of	drugs,	John	is	now,	perhaps,	able	to	strengthen	his	will	to	the	place	where	he	
can	control	his	drug	use.	
Returning	back	to	our	account	of	grace;	all	we	need	now	to	do	is	posit	that	God’s	revelation	
of	goodness	motivates	an	analogous	second-order	habit	forming	third-order	desire.	When	
appropriately	attended	to,	such	a	revelation	of	God’s	goodness	could,	then,	in	some	indirect	
sense,	be	operative	on	the	dispositions	of	the	second-order	will.	So,	if	either	one	of	these	
responses	gains	traction,	it	looks	like	this	objection	from	tradition	can	be	addressed	as	well.	
	
V.! Divine	Action	and	Other	Grace	
Might	this	account	of	operative	grace	extend	to	other	sorts	of	grace	as	well?	As	far	as	we	
can	see,	the	general	way	we	have	explained	operative	grace	(strengthening	the	will	through	
appropriate	reflection	on	the	revelation	of	God’s	goodness	in	creation)	is	the	only	way	to	
explain	how	any	sort	of	divine	grace	might	be	consistent	with	general	divine	action.	So,	if	
normal	grace	or	cooperative	grace	are	also	consistent	with	general	divine	action,	there	can	
be	no	majorly	substantive	difference	between	normal,	cooperative	and	operative	grace.	Is	
there	reason	to	think	this	is	the	case?	We	think	so.	
‘Operative	grace’	is	just	the	name	we	give	to	grace	that	actually	motivates	a	person	to	
effectively	desire	union	with	God	for	the	first	time	(which	is,	we	have	argued	elsewhere,	
culminates	the	process	of	justification).
20
	Likewise,	cooperative	grace	is	just	the	grace	that	
continues	to	motivate	a	person	to	desire	union	with	God	once	they	already	have	a	second-
order	volition	for	union	with	God	(which	we	described	as	the	process	of	sanctification).	The	
11	
	
only	difference	between	operative	and	cooperative	grace	is	that	in	the	latter	case,	the	
recipient	of	grace	already	has	a	second-order	volition	for	union	with	God.	Cooperative	grace	
is	considered	cooperative	because	the	recipient	accepts	the	gift	of	grace	(that	is,	the	effect	
of	operative	grace	is	to	leave	them	with	a	second-order	volition	to	accept	future	revelation	
of	God’s	goodness),	rather	than	merely	being	quiescent	with	respect	to	it.	If	we	can	explain	
operative	grace	in	a	way	that	is	compatible	with	general	divine	action,	we	can	also	explain	
cooperative	grace	in	such	a	manner,	too,	for	the	only	difference	between	the	two	is	the	in	
the	recipient	of	such	grace,	and	not	in	either	the	grace	itself	or	the	giver	of	the	grace,	and	
this	difference	in	the	recipient	of	grace	is	explained	by	the	effect	of	operative	grace.	
In	the	case	both	operative	and	cooperative	grace,	a	person’s	will	can	be	strengthened	by	
reflection	upon	the	revelation	of	the	goodness	of	God	revealed	through	God's	general	act	of	
creation.	Operative	grace	requires	our	quiescence	to	this	general	revelation	(but	not	our	
cooperative	acceptance	of	it	as	being	a	revelation	from	God),	whilst	cooperative	grace	
includes	our	cooperation	with	this	general	revelation	(that	is,	the	second-order	volition	we	
now	have	to	desire	union	with	God,	and	therefore,	the	willingness	to	see	the	revelation	of	
God’s	goodness	in	creation).	
Perhaps,	indeed,	normal	grace,	the	general	motivating	or	strengthening	of	the	will,	is	either	
operative	or	cooperative,	with	no	remainder.	For	this	to	be	the	case,	grace	must	always	
ultimately	motivate	a	desire	for	union	with	God.	But	here	note	that	the	desire	for	union	with	
God	is	an	ultimate	end,	and	often	worked	out	through	a	complex	system	of	secondary	
desires.	For	instance,	the	desire	for	union	with	God	is	incompatible	with	a	desire	to	leave	
the	naked	unclothed,	and	the	hungry	unfed.	As	a	result,	this	desire	for	union	with	God	
prompted	by	grace	could	also	prompt	(or	strengthen)	the	desire	to	feed	the	hungry	and	
12	
	
clothe	the	naked,	and	indeed,	this	desire	for	union	with	God	may	only	even	manifest	itself	in	
this	desire	to	clothe	and	feed.	If	this	is	the	case,	we	suggest	that	all	instances	of	grace	might	
be	(although	of	course,	need	not	be)	explained	by	general	divine	action.		
	
VI.! Conclusion	
In	concluding,	then,	we	have	proposed	an	account	of	operative	grace	that	is	compatible	
with	general	divine	action.	We	have	suggested	that	operative	grace	just	is	the	revelation	of	
God’s	goodness,	a	revelation	which	God	placed	evidence	of	into	His	creation	at	the	point	of	
creation,	and	that	this	revelation	can	still	be	‘understood	and	seen	through	the	things	he	has	
made’	(Romans	1:19-20)	such	that	this	grace	is	always	and	everywhere	available	to	all,	and	
has	been	since	the	divine	first	cause.	When	appropriately	attended	to,	this	grace,	we	
argued,	prompts	and	strengthens	a	desire	for	union	with	God	(a	constituent	aspect	saving	
faith,	or	so	we	say).	We	discussed	what	it	might	mean	to	‘appropriately	attend’	to	this	
revelation	in	a	way	consistent	with	both	general	divine	action	and	the	Anti-Pelagian	
Constraint.	We	then	addressed	one	concern	from	tradition,	that	operative	grace	be	
operative	on	both	intellect	and	will,	suggesting	that	our	‘inspiration’	account	has	an	
advantage	over	the	traditional	‘infusion’	account,	as	our	account	is	better	suited	to	explain	
APC	compatible	moral	responsibility	for	coming	to	saving	faith.	Finally,	we	suggested	one	
reason	to	think	that	this	account	of	operative	grace	might	extend	to	every	instance	of	grace;	
operative,	cooperative	and	normal.	
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explicit	or	conscious	feature	of	his	thought….On	this	view,	then,	it	is	possible	that	an	agent’s	intellect	
have	gone	through	some	process	which	contributes	to	a	certain	action	on	the	agent’s	part,	without	
the	agent’s	being	aware	of	that	process	as	it	is	occurring….So	to	hold,	as	Aquinas	does,	that	an	agent	
wills	to	do	some	action	p	only	if	his	intellect	represents	p	as	the	good	to	be	pursued	does	not	entail	
that	an	agent	does	an	action	willingly	only	in	case	he	first	engages	in	a	conscious	process	of	reasoning	
about	the	action.	Aquinas’s	view	requires	only	that	some	chain	of	reasoning	(even	if	invalid	and	
irrational	reasoning)	representing	p	as	the	good	to	be	pursued	would	figure	in	the	agent’s	own	
explanation	of	his	action.		
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8
	For	instance,	the	sort	of	manipulation	wrought	by	some	future	mad	neuroscientist.	
9
	See	Harry	Frankfurt,	‘Freedom	of	the	Will	and	the	Concept	of	a	Person’,	in	The	Journal	of	Philosophy	68:1	
(1971),	11-12.	Frankfurt	writes:	
	
I	shall	use	the	term	'wanton'	to	refer	to	agents	who	have	first-order	desires	but	who	are	not	persons	
because,	whether	or	not	they	have	desires	of	the	second	-order,	they	have	no	second-order	volitions.	
10
	For	an	account	of	saving	faith	as	a	second-order	desire	for	union	with	God,	see	David	Efird	and	David	
Worsley,	‘Critical	Review	of	Eleonore	Stump’s	Wandering	in	Darkness:	Narrative	and	the	Problem	of	Suffering’	
in	Philosophical	Quarterly	65:260	(2015),	547-558.	
11
	For	instance,	through	some	miraculous	second-personal	encounter	with	God,	or	with	God’s	word.	
12
	There	is	a	debate	in	the	secondary	literature	over	the	level	of	control	one	has	over	coming	to	quiescence.	
For	Stump	(in	‘Grace	and	Free	Will’),	coming	to	quiescence	is	not	necessarily	something	that	can	be	controlled	
(that	is	to	say,	quiescence	is	not	intentional,	not	a	product	of	a	second-order	volition).	However,	Timpe	argues	
(in	‘Grace	and	Controlling	What	We	Do	Not	Cause’),	if	it	cannot	be	controlled,	strictly	speaking	one	cannot	be	
said	to	have	had	any	control	over	whether	one	comes	to	saving	faith.	For	Timpe	(and	Ragland,	‘The	Trouble	
with	Quiescence’),	therefore,	coming	to	quiescence	is	a	state	that	you	have	some	sort	of	quasi-control	over	
15	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
(that	is,	that	quiescence	is	intentional,	it	is	the	product	of	a	second-order	volition).	Responding	to	Timpe’s	
claim,	Simon	Kittle	‘Grace	and	Free	Will:	Quiescence	and	Control’	in	The	Journal	of	Analytic	Theology	3	(2015),	
89-108,	argues	that,	if	one	can	control	(quasi	or	directly)	whether	one	is	quiescent	or	not,	then,	however	this	is	
explained,	such	a	view	cannot	be	compatible	with	the	Anti-Pelagian	Constraint	set	out	at	the	start	of	this	paper	
(for	if	quiescence	is	intentional,	if	it	is	the	product	of	a	second-order	volition,	and	if	one	knows	one	will	come	
to	saving	faith	if	one	is	quiescent,	coming	to	quiescence	looks	very	similar	indeed	to	APC	incompatible	
‘acceptance’).	In	response	to	Kittle’s	concern,	we	follow	Stump’s	initial	position:	you	are	not	in	control	over	
whether	you	are	quiescent	with	respect	to	God’s	operative	grace.	By	that	we	mean	that	you	do	not	form	an	
intentional	second-order	volition	to	become	quiescent,	so	quiescence	is	best	considered	a	first-order	wanton	
omission	(first-order	because	one	has	not	formed	a	second-order	volition	motivating	this	desire).	However,	it	
may	be	the	case	that	your	actions	might,	unintentionally,	make	it	easier	or	harder	to	for	God	(or	natural	
sufferings	and	blessing)	to	motivate	you	to	such	a	wanton	first-order	omission,	and	you	do	have	control	over	
that.	The	difference	between	our	position	and	Stump’s	comes	in	the	nature	of	grace.	For	Stump,	grace	is	
infused	into	a	person’s	will	by	God.	On	our	account,	grace	inspires	a	quiescent	person’s	intellect	to	move	their	
will	to	desire	union	with	God.	On	our	account,	it	is	your	intellect	that	presents	to	your	will	the	goodness	of	
union	with	God,	and	the	will	which	then	desires	this.	Unlike	on	Stump’s	(and	Timpe’s)	infusion	account,	there	
is	no	internal	manipulation	present,	there	is	only	mere	external	motivation	or	inspiration.	Although	this	
movement	from	intellect	to	will	might	be	a	subconscious	process,	it	is	a	process	contained	entirely	within	the	
agent,	and	recall	that	on	Aquinas’s	account,	one	therefore	remains	morally	responsible	for	this	action.	
Inasmuch	as	unintentionally	falling	in	love	with	another	person	does	not	look	problematic	to	the	seriousness	of	
whatever	relationship	ensues	(so	long	as	the	other	has	not	internally	manipulated	your	brain	to	so	fall	in	love),	
neither	is	unintentionally	falling	in	love	with	God	problematic,	at	least	as	far	as	we	can	see	it.	Just	as	one’s	
prior	action,	action	one	does	in	fact	control,	might	influence	the	sort	of	person	one	falls	in	love	with,	even	if	
one	never	intends	nor	foresees	this	outcome,	so	it	may	be	with	coming	to	desire	union	(that	is,	coming	to	love)	
God.	Interestingly,	coming	to	have	saving	faith	looks	like	it	might	mirror	almost	exactly	the	primal	sin.	Whilst	
the	primal	sinner	had	a	second-order	volition	for	justice	that	should	have	made	willing	lesser	goods	impossible,	
they	nevertheless	somehow	still	managed	a	first-order	volition	for	a	lesser	good.	For	the	fallen	person	coming	
to	saving	faith,	whilst	they	have	a	second-order	volition	for	lesser	goods	that	should	have	made	willing	greater	
goods	impossible,	they	nevertheless	somehow	still	manage	to	some	sort	of	first-order	volition	for	a	greater	
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good.	We	suspect	whatever	solution	we	have	for	the	primal	sin	(for	instance,	that	it	occurred	due	to	an	
omission	to	reflect	on	second	order	volitions)	will	also	come	to	bear	on	this	problem.	
13
	We	thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	pushing	us	on	this	point.	They	write:	
In	this	situation	the	Will	knows	that	'quiescence'	will	not	save	it;	something	like	'appropriate	
attention'	-	or	even	stronger	–	is	required.	Specifically,	it	needs	to	concentrate	or	fixate	on	the	one	
aspect	of	the	situation	its	desires	want	it	to	leave	out,	and	block	out	those	aspects	they	want	it	to	
uniquely	attend	to.	Typically	the	Will	knows	its	needs	special	strengthening	in	such	situations;	thus	
the	relevance	in	religious	services	to	singing	a	given	hymn	or	reciting	a	certain	prayer;	we	are	not	
disembodied	angels	who	can	simply	'attend'	to	creation	in	its	completeness	and	respond	
appropriately,	but	must	become	'self-movers',	treating	ourselves	as	both	subject	and	object,	to	
change	our	mood,	perspective,	sense	of	priorities,	etc.,	-	to	empower	ourselves	to	withstand	the	
'siren's	song'	emanating	from	our	desires.	It	is	for	this	alteration	of	the	Will	BY	the	Will	that	we	
request	God's	'special'	grace.	
However,	as	we	suggest,	God’s	help	in	bringing	us	to	‘appropriate	attention’	can	come	in	two	ways.	Certainly,	
God	can	internally	manipulate	a	person’s	will,	causing	their	will	to	focus	their	intellect	on	one	aspect	of	the	
situation	its	desires	want	it	to	leave	out.	However,	God	might	also	use	external	methods	to	achieve	this	same	
end.	We	suggest	that	natural	suffering,	or	blessing,	or	perplexity,	might	also	lead	to	the	same	effect,	causing	a	
person	to	block	out	certain	desires,	indeed	temporarily,	perhaps,	all	desires.	And	in	that	state	of	quiescence,	a	
person	might	appropriately	attend	to	this	revelation	of	goodness	and	come	to	saving	faith.	We	think	that	
whilst	the	former	‘internal	manipulation’	is	necessarily	an	instance	of	special	divine	action,	and	incompatible	
with	libertarian	free	will,	the	latter	‘external	manipulation’	is	not	necessarily	an	instance	of	special	divine	
action	(although	it	could	be),	and	is	compatible	with	liberation	freedom	of	the	will.	
14
	See	Stump,	‘Grace	and	Free	Will’,	387,	for	more	details.	Stump	writes:	
	
The	notion	of	a	heart’s	cracking	or	melting	is,	of	course,	a	metaphor.	To	speak	of	something’s	cracking	
or	melting	is	to	describe	something’s	giving	way	to	an	external	force	after	(or	in	spite	of)	some	
internal	resistance	or	disinclination.	To	say	that	a	heart	cracks	or	melts,	then,	is	to	imply	that	a	will	
which	previously	was	resistant	or	disinclined	towards	something	urged	on	it	by	someone	(or	
something)	else	gives	over	its	dissent	and	leaves	off	its	resistance.	
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15
	One	problem	with	this	‘infusion’	account	comes	when	one	thinks	about	the	nature	of	union.	Serious	sorts	of	
union	must	be	product	of	two	wills,	but	on	this	infusion	account,	unless	one	intentionally	acts	to	permit	such	
an	infusion	(the	position	Timpe	(in	‘Grace	and	Controlling	What	We	Do	Not	Cause’)	argues	must	be	the	case),	
union	can	only	ever	be	the	product	of	one	will,	namely,	Gods.	For	God	infuses	in	you	the	desire	to	will	union	
with	Him.	On	our	account,	God	merely	inspires	this	desire,	and	so	there	is	no	such	internal	manipulation	in	a	
person’s	moral	psychology.	Without	this	internal	manipulation,	intentional	control	is	less	important	for	us	than	
it	is	for	Timpe.	In	as	much	as	Jack	unintentionally	falling	in	love	with	Jill	does	not	reduce	the	seriousness	of	
whatever	union	then	follows	between	them,	neither	would	Jack	unintentionally	falling	in	love	with	God	reduce	
the	seriousness	of	whatever	union	then	follows	between	them.	
16
	See	his	Summa	Theologicae,	I.II	q.	82	a.	2,	
	
Now	just	as	something	may	belong	to	the	person	as	such,	and	also	something	through	the	gift	of	
grace,	so	may	something	belong	to	the	nature	as	such,	viz.	whatever	is	caused	by	the	principles	of	
nature,	and	something	too	through	the	gift	of	grace.	In	this	way	original	justice,	as	stated	in	the	
I:100:1,	was	a	gift	of	grace,	conferred	by	God	on	all	human	nature	in	our	first	parent.	This	gift	the	first	
man	lost	by	his	first	sin.	Wherefore	as	that	original	justice	together	with	the	nature	was	to	have	been	
transmitted	to	his	posterity,	so	also	was	its	disorder.	Other	actual	sins,	however,	whether	of	the	first	
parent	or	of	others,	do	not	corrupt	the	nature	as	nature,	but	only	as	the	nature	of	that	person,	i.e.	in	
respect	of	the	proneness	to	sin:	and	consequently	other	sins	are	not	transmitted.	
17
	See	Genesis	5:7,	6:5	and	Judges	17:6.	
18
	Stump	writes,		
	
[I]n	forming	a	third-order	volition,	the	agent	is	not	reiterating	the	process	gone	through	to	formulate	
a	second-order	volition...forming	a	third-order	volition	consists	in	reasoning	about	and	either	
accepting	or	rejecting	a	second-order	volition.	So	an	agent	has	a	third-order	volition	V3	to	bring	about	
some	second-order	volition	V2	in	himself	only	if	his	intellect	at	the	time	of	the	willing	represents	V2,	
under	some	description,	as	the	good	to	be	pursued.	But	since	V2	is	a	desire	for	a	first-order	volition	
V1	generated	by	a	reason’s	representing	V1	(at	that	time)	as	the	good	to	be	pursued,	V3	will	consist	
just	in	reaffirming	the	original	reasoning	about	V1	which	led	to	V2.	In	forming	a	third-order	volition	
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and	considering	whether	he	wants	to	have	the	relevant	second-order	volition,	the	agent	will	consider	
whether	a	desire	for	a	desire	for	some	action	p	(or	state	of	affairs	q)	is	the	good	to	be	pursued.	But	a	
desire	for	a	desire	for	p	(or	q)	will	be	a	good	to	be	pursued	just	in	case	the	desire	for	p	(or	q)	is	a	good	
to	be	pursued,	and	that	in	turn	will	depend	on	whether	the	agent	considers	p	(or	q),	under	some	
description,	at	that	time,	a	good	to	be	pursued.	So	a	third-order	volition	that	supports	a	currently	held	
second-order	volition	is	in	effect	just	the	expression	of	a	re-evaluating	and	affirming	of	the	reasoning	
that	originally	led	to	V1.	And,	in	the	same	way,	a	third-order	volition	that	rejects	a	currently	held	
second-order	volition	will	just	be	an	expression	of	the	re-evaluation	and	rejection	of	the	reasoning	
that	led	to	the	second-order	volition.	A	third-order	volition,	then,	is	a	result	of	a	recalculation	of	the	
reasoning	that	originally	underlay	a	second-order	volition.	(Stump,	‘Sanctification,	Hardening	of	the	
Heart,	and	Frankfurt’s	Concept	of	Free	Wil’,	405)	
19
	Stump	(‘Sanctification,	Hardening	of	the	Heart,	and	Frankfurt’s	Concept	of	Free	Will’,	406)	writes	regarding	
third-order	desires,	‘There	are	also	cases	in	which	an	agent's	reasoning	is	confused	and	warrants	conflicting	
second-order	desires.	An	agent	who	notices	such	a	conflict	in	his	second-order	desires	and	who	reflects	on	it	
may	then	sort	out	the	confusion	in	his	reasoning	and	form	a	third-order	volition	in	consequence.’	
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	See	Efird	and	Worsley,	‘Critical	Review	of	Eleonore	Stump’s	Wandering	in	Darkness:	Narrative	and	the	
Problem	of	Suffering’	547-8.	We	argue	that	justification	and	sanctification	refer	to	two	aspects	of	the	same	
continuous	process,	namely,	the	integration	of	all	second-order	desires	around	a	second-order	volition	for	
union	with	God,	and	the	alignment	of	first-	and	second-order	volitions.	The	process	of	justification	prompts	a	
(non-wholehearted)	second-order	volition	for	union	with	God.	The	process	of	sanctification	integrates	other	
second-order	desires	around	the	second-order	volition	of	justification,	as	well	as	strengthening	this	second-
order	volition	so	as	to	ensure	first-order	volitions	align	with	it.	We	conclude	that	union	with	God	requires	
acting	upon	a	wholehearted	second-order	volition,	and	the	completion	of	this	two-part	process	is	the	only	
mechanism	by	which	this	can	happen	in	a	fallen	person.	
